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Men's provisioning of mates and offspring has been central to ideas about human evolution because paternal provisioning is absent in our closest evolutionary cousins, the great apes, and is widely assumed to result in pair bonding, which distinguishes us from them. Yet mathematical modelling has shown that paternal care does not readily spread in populations where competition for multiple mates is the common male strategy. Here we add to models that point to the mating sex ratio as an explanation for pairing as pay-offs to mate guarding rise with a male-biased sex ratio. This is of interest for human evolution because our grandmothering life history shifts the mating sex ratio from female-to male-biased. Using a difference equation model, we explore the relative pay-offs for three competing male strategies (dependant care, multiple mating, mate guarding) in response to changing adult sex ratios. When fertile females are abundant, multiple mating prevails. As they become scarce, mate guarding triumphs. The threshold for this shift depends on guarding efficiency. Combined with mating sex ratios of hunter-gatherer and chimpanzee populations, these results strengthen the hypothesis that the evolution of our grandmothering life history propelled the shift to pair bonding in the human lineage.
This article is part of the themed issue 'Adult sex ratios and reproductive decisions: a critical re-examination of sex differences in human and animal societies'.
Male reproductive strategies
Persistent bonds between mating pairs are common in birds, but social monogamy is rare in mammals, where females are committed to internal gestation and lactation. Those female commitments determine the opportunities for fathering, and males may gain more paternities by outcompeting other males for multiple mates rather than remaining with one. Yet unlike most mammals, including our closest primate cousins, humans regularly form pair bonds. The stability of these relationships varies widely both among and within human communities, but adults usually form pair bonds across the wide array of subsistence and social systems observed historically and ethnographically.
To explain the origins of human pair bonding, evolutionary anthropologists use many lines of evidence. Two of them are especially influential. First, the archaeological record of our lineage begins more than 2 million years ago with stone tools and the bones of large animals. Second, among living people who depend on wild foods, men usually hunt while women usually gather. Our species, let alone our genus, evolved before the origins of agriculture about 10 -12 thousand years ago. So hunter -gatherers are especially useful windows into the ancient problems and solutions for getting a living that contributed to the evolution of our lineage. The earliest archaeology and foraging specializations by sex seem consistent with the hunting hypothesis, which proposes that human pair bonding evolved when ancestral populations began to rely on hunting, and ancestral females paired with hunters who in turn provisioned their offspring.
The benefit of this paternal provisioning made nuclear families units of common economic and reproductive interest resulting in the shorter interbirth intervals and higher survival of long-dependent juveniles that is characteristic of humans [1] [2] [3] . Yet the absence of paternal provisioning and pair bonding in the non-human members of our hominid radiation, the great apes, indicates that a male strategy of multiple mating, with males competing for paternities of the offspring of all available females, is the likely ancestral condition of our own lineage. When most males are seeking multiple mates, caring for dependent juveniles must not only trade off against the possibility of gaining more paternities elsewhere, but also risk supplying fitness benefits to competitors who secure the paternities of those dependants. This points to possible benefits for a third strategy. In addition to seeking multiple mates or devoting care to dependants, a male might invest his time and effort into guarding a mate to prevent competitors from gaining extra-pair paternities. Guarding is action to protect one's mate from successful matings with a competing male.
From this perspective, males are faced with a form of 'the social dilemma', where increased production-in this case care that increases the production of dependants-raises the pay-off for theft [4, 5] . This simplification identifies three mutually exclusive ways for males to earn reproductive benefits. Net gains from effort devoted to seeking additional mates, or from increasing dependant survival, or from increasing paternity certainty then depend on the strategies of the competing males.
Recent work increasingly challenges conventional arguments for the evolution of pair bonds in humans as a result of paternal provision. This includes quantitative observations of modern hunter-gatherers in which the daily failure risk of hunters coupled with wide distribution of bonanzas when they are successful challenges the view that hunting is paternal effort. The meat of big animals is not controlled by the successful hunter but treated more as a common good with shares claimed widely and mostly consumed by those outside his own nuclear family [6 -8] . Moreover, comparative analyses of the social systems of non-human mammals find that when paternal care does occur, it is a consequence rather than a cause of pair bonding or social monogamy [9, 10] . Although definitions of both pair bonding and social monogamy vary, researchers sometimes restrict the category of pairing species to cases where pairs or families are not embedded in larger social groups. For simplicity we ignore these issues here, as well as the possibility of males maintaining multiple pair bonds. Even with this simplification, we find that guarding becomes the most successful male strategy when mating sex ratios are sufficiently male-biased.
Variation in the success of male mating strategies depends on the number of competitors [11, 12] . Evolutionary biologists have focused attention on the importance of the sex ratio in the fertile ages, conventionally labelled the adult sex ratio (ASR) [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] , as most animals are fertile throughout adulthood. But such lifelong fertility is not the case for human females, whose fertility ends at about the same age as it ends in other great ape females. However, other great ape females display geriatric impairments while they are still fertile and usually die before reaching menopause [18] . By contrast, women can remain healthy and productive well beyond their fertile years even in the higher mortality regimes experienced by hunter-gatherers [19, 20] . One proposal to explain the evolution of human post-menopausal longevity is the grandmother hypothesis [20, 21] . It proposes that postmenopausal longevity evolved in our lineage when habitats in ancient Africa became more open, and ancestral populations did not follow the receding forests. Savannah foods offered high return rates, but not to youngsters too small to handle them effectively. That could have meant higher cost to mothers, but as older females whose own fertility was declining continued to acquire and process these foods, their subsidies allowed mothers to produce more offspring sooner. According to the hypothesis, grandmothers that were ageing a bit more slowly could subsidize more. Consequently, they left more descendants and longevity increased in subsequent generations. As longevity increased in both sexes, the physiology of sperm production carried fertility to older ages in males. Simulations of a mathematical model of the grandmother hypothesis [22, 23] track sex ratios in the fertile ages (ASR) as grandmothering subsidies drive model populations from a great ape -like life history to a human-like one [16] . Across the transition, ASRs shift from female to male-biased, consistent with the notion [16, p. 11806 ] that 'our distinctive life history . . . supplies previously unrecognized support for a mate-guarding hypothesis for the evolution of human pair bonds. ' In this paper, we investigate how the ASR affects the long-term equilibrium male strategy and explore the sensitivity of the resulting equilibrium to assumptions about the effectiveness of guarding and the magnitude of the effect of male care on dependant survival. Following and adding to assumptions found in Schacht & Bell [17] , we develop a discrete difference equation model to explore the effects of mate guarding, the benefits of male care for dependant survival, extra-pair paternity and partner availability on the evolution of three male strategies, assuming offspring fully inherit the strategy of their father. Assumptions of frequency-dependent mating success follow those of Schacht & Bell [17] , and the strategies under consideration are similar to those investigated in Hawkes et al. [5] . We use an alternative modelling approach, include parameters that allow for guarding inefficiencies, and compare our results with those of Hawkes et al. [5] and Schacht & Bell [17] . Whereas Schacht & Bell [17] consider only perfectly effective guarding, we set limits on guarding effectiveness that lead to less than perfect paternity certainty to investigate the importance of this issue in a world likely to include some extra-pair paternities.
Since our goal is to explore the relative pay-offs of these strategies under different sex ratios in the fertile ages, we use the simplifying assumption that they are mutually exclusive, so that effort devoted to competing for new mates cannot also be devoted to guarding a current one, nor can effort devoted to guarding a current mate be devoted to caring for her offspring, and conversely. This follows from Tullock's first argument about the social dilemma [4, p. 9] , where, noting that 'theft is the oldest labour saving device,' he invites readers to ' . . . consider a society in which theft is completely unrestricted, i.e. no resources of any sort are devoted to preventing theft . . . under these circumstances, it is almost always true that the most highly profitable "investment" of resources is to take something from your neighbor'. In addition to assuming mutual exclusion we also ignore the possibility of strategy switching to investigate the relative rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20170041 pay-offs of static, pure strategies depending on the ASR. The steps of our model are detailed in the electronic supplementary material and outlined in further sections.
Model
We consider dependant care, P; multiple mating, M; and mate guarding, separated into two compartments-those who are actively searching for a female to guard, S, and those who are currently guarding a female, G. This allows us to track the number of guarded pairs, and the number of actively searching males, whose presence makes it difficult for multiple maters and caring males to obtain paternities and vice versa. Searching males, S, produce no offspring at a given time, and guarding males, G, are also able to either guard a female long-term or transition back to searching if pairs break up. We loosen the restriction of lifelong pair bonding that was implicit in previous models [17] , by introducing a parameter for the rate of pair-bond break-up, b.
Before mating can occur, we allow new guarding pairs to form at a frequency-dependent rate, prior to offspring birth, mirroring pre-copulatory mate-guarding. Then, the number of paternities assigned to each male strategy is determined by the number of females available, their intrinsic birth rate and the number of males competing. Paternities are then adjusted for the extra-pair winnings by multiple-mating males. As in previous models [5, 17] , multiple maters can steal paternities from caring males who continue to care for their mate's offspring. Paternities of caring males are available to theft at a proportion e P . Those offspring benefit from the carer's effort, but are the direct offspring of the multiple mater. In addition to this extra-pair loss to carers, we introduce a similar sensitivity parameter for theft from guarders. We assume an equal sex ratio at birth: half of the offspring born are female and half male.
We assume that multiple maters have greater access to paternities of the offspring of caring rather than guarding males' mates. This follows from our definitions. Guarding males focus their effort on preventing multiple maters' access to their mates aiming to increase the likelihood of their own paternity of their mates' offspring. Carers, by contrast, devote their effort to the welfare of their mates' offspring by provisioning them. Thus, paternity lost by guarders will be no greater than paternity lost by carers, e G e P , and is bound by [0, 1]. The higher e G , the less effective the guarding and so more likely the extra-pair paternity. Cases where the requirement of e G e P is relaxed are presented in the electronic supplementary material.
Offspring of the mates of caring males have an adjusted survival rate, based on a parameter quantifying the benefit of care, c. In other models [5, 17, 24] , the benefit of care increases the number of offspring a female produces within a given time step. Schacht & Bell [17, p. 2] describe the benefit from caring males as providing 'a survival benefit (c) to offspring', but their mathematical model defines care as allowing females to have (1 þ c) offspring. Female fecundity is modelled in a similar way in Hawkes et al. [5] . We model the benefit of care as a reduction of offspring mortality, rather than increased birth rate. These are mathematically different, as the offspring mortality rate is directly adjusted by the care benefit. In the case where female fecundity is increased as a result of care, the mates of caring males can produce up to two offspring in any given time step (when c ¼ 1), simulating a situation where the interbirth interval is reduced. Alternatively, when offspring mortality is adjusted, females are restricted to one offspring per time step, and if care is perfectly effective (c ¼ 1), their offspring never die as juveniles.
Mortality rate of adults is defined separately from that of juveniles. To impose a changing ASR on the model, we define sex-specific removal rates to obtain a target ASR. This is a simple way of mimicking the change in ASR that accompanies the evolution of post-menopausal longevity in our lineage. A male-biased ASR is obtained by increasing the female removal rate, and conversely, a female-biased ASR, as is typical of most mammals due to higher male mortality, results from increasing the male removal rate. We define the ASR as a proportion of males in the total fertile population, M/(M þ F ), as proposed by Ancona et al. [25] who point out that this definition, unlike the conventional proper ratio of males to females (M/F), is symmetric about 0.5, and bound within [0, 1]. But we also include the widely used M/F, fertile males to fertile females for its probably greater familiarity to readers. Figure 1 illustrates the processes in the model, and table 1 lists parameters, with further details in the electronic supplementary material. We simulate these dynamics in Matlab and compare the frequencies of equilibrium strategies for populations that do not go extinct.
(a) Parameter estimates
We assume a time step of 10 years, Dt ¼ 10 years, in order to capture an average of one offspring per female per time step. This takes into account weaning time and child dependency. This time step follows the implicit choice of time step given in Schacht & Bell [17] , where females produce one offspring per A continuous model will remove problems that arise with this lengthy time step, but requires a more complicated age structure than fits our scope here. Further, we define the birth rate, b, as 1 offspring per time step. Mortality rates are chosen as adult mortality rate, r A ¼ 0.03, which is adjusted by sex, and immature mortality rate, r C ¼ 0.02, which is adjusted by care.
The effect of changing adult sex ratio on male strategy frequencies
It is of special interest to consider the difference in equilibrium strategy at great ape-and human-like sex ratios, taking these values from Coxworth et al. [16] . Here in table 2, ASRs are given as the proportion of males in the total fertile population [25] (a ratio calculated by Coxworth et al. [16] , and appearing in the second column of their tables 1 and 2), and in the third column as the more widely used ratio of fertile males to fertile females, M/F. They [16, p. 11 808] used the life tables in the sources cited and, assuming stationary populations, calculated the ASR by modelling age structure using 'probability of survival to each age in the published life tables, summing the calculated number of survivors for males and females to each of the fertile ages, then dividing the sum for each sex by their combined total to get the fraction of fertile adults by sex.' For chimpanzees they assumed [16, p. 11808 ] that fertile ages 'included males older than 15 years and females between ages 10 and 45 years' [18] . For non-humans, ASR calculation can be met with some challenges [25] , but is relatively straightforward, as all adult males and females can be counted as eligible for conception. For humans, fertile ages 'included men from 20 and 65 years based on reported age ranges of fertilities from the ethnographers and those reported by Tuljapurkar et al.' [34] . 'Women from 20 to 40 years are included based on average ages of first and last birth' [35] . Issues around calculating human ASRs and alternative estimates are considered in the Discussion section. Figure 2 displays the long-term equilibrium strategies in our model at the representative ASRs in table 2. Figure 2 show that at a chimpanzee-like female-biased ASR of 0.41 or less, multiple mating takes over the population. In fact, this is the case for all female-biased sex ratios (ASR , 0.5). Based on the frequency-dependent birth function (see electronic supplementary material, Table S1), the benefit of gaining the extra paternities at such a female-biased ASR, once guarding and caring males have obtained their mates, is large enough to push the long-term equilibrium strategy to favour multiple-mating males.
Now consider a human-like male-biased ASR of 0.62, following ethnographically based estimates of the ASR of the Hadza, in particular, as given in table 2. In figure 2a,b,d , the guarding strategy is favoured, while in figure 2c, the case of high pair-bond break and inefficient guarding, multiple mating is still favoured. At a male-biased ASR such as this, changes to the value of the guarding benefit parameter define regions within which different equilibrium stable Table 2 . ASR values taken from specific assumptions about fertile ages [16] , and mortality profiles calculated for specific empirical populations (see the text for further specifics). The first population is taken from a synthetic mortality schedule based on five different chimpanzee populations [26] . The second is a later, larger (although still very small) dataset from one of these chimpanzee populations [27] . Fertile ages include all males older than 15 years, and females between 10 and 45 years. The following populations are human hunter -gatherers as reported by [28 -31] . Fertile ages include males 20 -65, and females from 20 to 40. These estimates of the ASR differ from others reported [32, 33] 
Sensitivity of the equilibrium strategy to changes in likelihood of extra-pair paternities
Investigating the changing frequency of strategies as parameters change reveals the sensitivity of the system to changes in the efficiency of guarding. If e G is even a minuscule amount above 0, the ASR at which the population switches from multiple mating to guarding increases. This puts the ASR at which the switch occurs between 0.5 and 0.62, a range that is especially relevant when considering issues of human evolution since it includes the ASRs of human hunter-gatherer populations in table 2. If guarding is highly inefficient (e G close to 1) then it is possible for a population with a human-like ASR (less than 0.62) to be overtaken by multiple maters. Figure 3 shows the effect of guarding inefficiency, e G , on the ASR at which guarding takes over the population, when care (c) is low, stealing from cared mates (e P ) is high, and pair-bond break (b) is high. When the paternities of guarded females' offspring are unavailable to multiple maters, e G ¼ 0, guarders begin to take over the population at an equal ASR, i.e. fertile M/(M þ F) ¼ 0.5. When e G . 0, by the smallest amount, so guarding is anything less than perfectly effective, the point of guarding takeover is quickly pushed to ASR . 0.57. If guarding is any less effective, the ASR at which guarding takes over increases, rising as the paternities of guarded females' offspring become more available to multiple maters until e G ¼ 1, the point of switch is at ASR ¼ 0.62.
In our hunter-gatherer sample, ASRs range between 0.58 and 0.65, where winning strategies depend strongly on the efficiency of guarding. It is possible for multiple mating to persist in populations with human-like mating sex ratios, as long as guarding is not perfectly effective. This shift in the point at which mate guarding takes over shows how important guarding efficiency is in determining the winning strategy.
Effect of care on equilibrium strategy frequencies
A care benefit of c ¼ 0.2 is assumed in figure 2 where carers do not succeed against multiple maters of guarders. Simulations Figure 3 . Effect of changing guarding inefficiency, e G , on the ASR at which the dominant strategy switches from multiple mating to guarding, i.e. when guarding begins to take over the population. When e G is just greater than zero, so guarding is slightly less than perfectly effective, the ASR required for guarding to take over from multiple mating rises immediately from 0.5 to 0.57 and the takeover threshold ASR for guarding increases, becoming more male biased with decreasing effectiveness of guarding. Other parameters used are b ¼ 0.8, c ¼ 0.2 and e P ¼ 1. When e G ¼ 1, all guarded females' offspring are susceptible to extra-pair paternities by multiple-mating males, and the sex ratio at which guarding begins to take over is 0.62. (Online version in colour.) rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20170041
show that care only persists in the population at near equal sex ratios, and where multiple maters get no extra-pair paternities of carers' mates' offspring, i.e. e P ¼ 0 ( figure 4a,b) . With no theft possible by multiple maters, there is a range of ASRs where the strategy of care outperforms other strategies. Larger care benefit (figure 4b) expands the range of ASR values at which care overcomes both multiple mating and guarding. However, once the male's dilemma is recognized, and extra-pair paternities can occur, this region of care disappears ( figure 4c,d ). Note that if no theft of paternity from carers can occur, caring effort effectively includes perfectly comprehensive guarding. Otherwise, extra-pair paternity of the offspring of carers' mates should be at least possible. When there is any chance of theft, even if care results in immortal offspring, caring does not persist in the population.
Discussion
Various mathematical models have shown paternal care to be an insufficient basis for the evolution of pair-bonding. Regardless of the magnitude of care benefit for dependant survival (even to the point of near-immortality, as shown in figure 4 ), as long as paternity is less than certain, male care is not sufficient to explain the evolution of social monogamy or pair bonding as a male mating strategy. While there are parameter sets within which care is the long-term equilibrium strategy, this is only when carers have certain paternity. Certain paternity further implies that guarding is required for the evolution of pair bonding. Moreover, here guarding is only favoured when ASRs are male biased, highlighting the importance of likely links between the male-biased ASRs that accompanied the evolution of our grandmothering life history on the one hand, and the evolution of pair bonding in our lineage on the other [16] . Our results concur with Schacht & Bell [17] who used alternative assumptions and a different modelling approach.
Comparing our results to those of Schacht & Bell [17] shows that our inefficiency parameter produces similar results to reducing the probability of male survival from one period to the next, their u. However, while the effect is similar, the interpretation is not. If a male does not survive, he will not produce offspring. This is different from a male being cuckolded, or failing to produce offspring at that time step. Further, the parameter u (in [17] ) limits the scope of both caring and guarding strategies. Here we use parameters b and e G to target variation in the mateguarding strategy. By doing so, we show the high sensitivity of the model to guarding inefficiencies. Even with reduced benefits, guarding still has overwhelming success at very male-biased sex ratios.
Previous exploration of the relative pay-offs to the male strategies considered here [5] paralleled Hirshleifer's [36] treatment of the social dilemma, and equilibrium allocations showed very little care. Even reducing marginal gains for additional guarding effort, Hawkes et al. [5] found high allocation to guarding throughout a wide range of parameter values. The question then arises: if mate guarding is so successful in such a general model, why is it so rare in mammals? Here we show the fundamental importance of a variable they did not consider, the ASR, and find that in contrast with their results, multiple mating not only dominates female-biased ASRs, but when guarding is even slightly inefficient, multiple mating continues to dominate into male-biased sex ratios.
We note the difference from results obtained by Gavrilets [24] , who introduced heterogeneity in males, female choice for provisioning mates and female faithfulness to solve the male's dilemma. In his constructions, guarding disappeared early as a possible alternative. Gavrilets' conclusion about what is required in order for pair-bonding to evolve differs from our results showing the overwhelming persistence of multiple mating even in male-biased populations, where rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20170041 the paternity of carers is less than perfectly certain, as well as the likely success of guarding as a strategy at human-like mating sex ratios.
The ASR estimates we use to represent humans are from Coxworth et al. [16] [37, p. 258] when elaborating his theory of sexual selection, he noted that 'unarmed, unadorned, or unattractive males would succeed equally well in the battle for life and in leaving a numerous progeny, if better endowed males were not present.' If the measure of male fertility is realized paternities, then males that fail to win them may not be counted as competitors, even when the competitive threat they pose is an important driver of selection (e.g. the bachelor threat, for equids [38, 39] , for primates [40] ). When old men get no more paternities because younger men out-compete them, and when unmarried men are not counted-including physiologically fertile 'sub adults' because local conventions deem them still ineligible to marry-dynamics that play major roles in constructing and maintaining social institutions are obscured (see [41] and references therein).
Note that Coxworth et al. [16] fell prey to this problem themselves when they used age-specific fertilities to exclude men under 20 from the fertile ages. So the high human sex ratios used here are still underestimates. On the other hand, Coxworth et al. [16] also note that the hunter -gatherer populations are all growing, which means that the stationary population assumption they used to calculate sex ratios from life tables overestimates older age classes.
In this volume, Kramer et al. [33] investigate a longitudinal dataset for another population of hunter-gatherers showing that the stochasticity of birth sex ratios has an enormous effect on ASRs in very small populations. Pume first births are relatively early compared to other foragers and Kramer and colleagues use birth records to calculate both a beginning and end to fertilities that are notably earlier than the estimates used by Coxworth et al. [16] for other foragers. The longitudinal Pume data and modelling of the year-toyear shifts in age structure incorporate attention to individual heterogeneity and show extreme annual variation. Of special interest here, those annual ASRs range from 0.43 to 0.67, encompassing the entire range in our table 2 from Coxworth and colleagues' [16] calculations for both chimpanzees and human foragers. Not only does this further underscore questions about how to appraise and compare ASRs, it also raises questions about the time scale of ASR effects on behavioural strategies that are not our topic here.
Our results follow Schacht & Bell [17] in showing that the pay-offs for male strategies change with the sex ratio in the fertile ages, and so we expect-as did they-that male strategies would evolve in response to the changing availability of females. Partner scarcity can make the pay-off rise for protecting one's mate from competing males and, depending on its effectiveness, mate guarding can become the winning strategy. This is of special interest for the evolution of our own lineage. Human populations everywhere include large fractions of women who are past their fertile years [19, 28, 29, 31] , resulting in notably male-biased human ASRs. Such a male bias is rare among mammals, and distinguishes us from our closest living relatives, the great apes, where females become frail and usually die during their fertile years [18, 26] . Our modelling aligns with other work that shows pair bonds are unlikely to evolve due to the benefits of paternal care, while strengthening the hypothesis that the evolution of our grandmothering life history made persistent pairing advantageous in the evolution of the human lineage [16] .
